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“In order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of race. There is 
no other way. And in order to treat some persons equally, we must treat 
them differently. . . .” —  
Harry A. Blackmun, former U.S. Supreme Court Justice.
1
   
Employment discrimination is more prevalent today than ever.  During a time when 
America has elected its first black President, one would at least think that black job applicants 
would have employment opportunities equal to those of their white counterparts.  Unfortunately, 
the notion of employment equality has consistently been proven to be unfounded in today‟s 
society.  The blatant acts of discrimination that black citizens became so accustomed to hundreds 
of years ago have taken on a more facially neutral form.  There are no longer signs hanging 
outside of businesses stating, “We Don‟t Hire Blacks” or “White Applicants Only.”  Since the 
passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
2
, employers now know that such manifest 
acts of discrimination would no longer be tolerated under the law. 
In today‟s society, employers are increasingly using discriminatory practices such as 
stereotypes and grooming policies to deny black applicants employment and advancement 
opportunities equivalent to those of white applicants.  Many employers frequently associate 
being black with words such as “incompetent” and “unworthy.”
3
  Consequently, even though the 
                                                          
1
Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978).  
2
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2008). 
3
 D. Aaron Lacy, The Most Endangered Title VII Plaintiff?: Exponential Discrimination Against Black Males, 86 
NEB. L. REV. 552, 564 (2008). 
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number of college educated black candidates has continually increased since 1985,
4
 they do not 
tend to fare as well in job placement when compared to white candidates.  This phenomenon can 
be attributed to the discriminatory tactics used by many employers in today‟s labor market.  




Discriminatory employment practices utilized by many employers will likely not cease 
until the legal system realizes that its approach to combating these practices is out of touch with 
the facial neutrality of these employed methods.  Title VII has failed to safeguard African 
Americans from the sword of racial employment practices mainly because the Act has primarily 
been applied by federal courts in a manner that does not comport with the realities of modern 
racism.
6
  Although, various federal courts once acknowledged that race was a fluid and socially 
constructed concept, many currently view race as totally a physical concept.
7
  This view leaves 




Part II of this article begins with a hypothetical involving a black male by the name of 
Treyvon Smith who is about to graduate from business school.  The article follows his plight as 
Treyvon struggles with the reality that his race may be the single factor that is hindering his job 
search, even though he has sent numerous resumes to employers exhibiting qualifications 
superior to many of his peers who have advanced in their employment searches.  
                                                          
4
 African Americans Continue to Make Solid Gains in Bachelor and Master Degree Awards: But Professional and 
Doctoral Degrees Show Declines, The Journal of Blacks in Higher Education, July 1, 2008 (Anonymous) (since 
1985 the number of blacks earning bachelor‟s degrees have increased by 148 percent).  
5
 See infra Part V. 
6
 Angela Onwuachi-Willig, By Any Other Name?: On Being “Regarded As” Black, and Why Title VII Should Apply 
Even if Lakisha and Jamal are White, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 1283, 1284 (2005). 
7





Part III of the article introduces Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and thoroughly 
examines the two frameworks which are recognized by most courts in the United States.  Case 
law demonstrates the manner in which the Supreme Court uses Title VII frameworks to render 
judicial opinions.  
  Part IV leads into a discussion about the term “race,” and further explores how it has 
been defined and applied historically.  It examines various studies and opinions of scholars who 
have sought to determine whether race is primarily a biological concept or a product of society.  
Additionally, this section reveals that the inability of society and the judiciary to decide on a 
concrete definition of the term “race” has led to a lack of protection being afforded to black 
citizens who have filed discrimination claims. 
Part V takes an in-depth look into discriminatory employment practices used in today‟s 
labor market once resumes have been submitted for advertised positions, and also once 
applicants have been successful in obtaining an offer of employment.  Studies by  Marianne 
Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan,
9
 and Margery Austin Turner, Michael Fox and Raymond J. 
Struyk,
10
 are analyzed to demonstrate that simply being “black” can decrease one‟s employment 
opportunities. Further, these studies reveal that black applicants who have excellent 
qualifications still do not fare as well as their white counterparts.  Most importantly, the studies 
seriously raise inquiries regarding the effectiveness of Title VII as a cure for racially 
discriminatory employment practices.   
                                                          
9
 Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable Than Lakisha and Jamal? A 
Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination (Nat‟l Bureau of Econ. Research, Paper No. 9873, 2002), 
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w9873. 
10
 MARGERY A. TURNER et al., OPPORTUNITIES DENIED, OPPORTUNITIES DIMINISHED; RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN 
HIRING, 2 (Urban Institute Report, 91-9) (1991). 
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Part VI argues that current case law fails to acknowledge that employer decision-making 
based upon stereotypes is a form of disparate treatment based on race.  A review of case law will 
demonstrate that requirements such as grooming policies are regularly used by employers to 
discriminate against black employees.  Further, additional case law will reveal the unwillingness 
of courts to acknowledge these types of policies as proxies for race discrimination. 
Part VII charts a course for reform of current anti-discrimination approaches.  It examines 
various suggested changes to current anti-discrimination law and advocates an approach that will 
make the EEO process more efficient and effective.  It argues that the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) should refocus its efforts away from individual complaints 
of discrimination so that it may aggressively target the employment practices of employers in 
today‟s labor market. 
II.   HYPOTHETICAL 
Treyvon Smith is a young black man who is completing his final semester of business 
school at Midlands University.  The university is situated in an affluent suburb of the city of 
Midlands.  Treyvon is one of only a few black students who were fortunate to gain admissions to 
Midlands University through a minority grant program.  Midlands University is predominately 
traditional in its racial composition.  Treyvon looks and acts quite differently than his black 
counterparts at Midlands University.  He wears his hair in nicely groomed dreadlocks.  Also, 
Treyvon is very proud of his black heritage and frequently speaks to his classmates regarding his 
cultural background.  Treyvon lives in an area south of downtown Midlands which is 
predominately populated by low-income black families. 
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Although, Treyvon is quite distinguishable from most students at Midland University, he 
has generally been accepted by a vast number of his peers.  Until recently, Treyvon has never 
had a reason to question his pride and status as a black man.  The time of year has approached 
when students who will graduate are to begin submitting their resumes to various employers 
throughout the city of Midlands.  Treyvon is thankful that he had an opportunity to complete two 
internships during his time at Midlands University.  He is confident that these experiences will 
place him ahead of many students who have not had an opportunity to take advantage of such 
experiences.   
Currently, more than five weeks have passed since Treyvon has sent numerous resumes 
to prospective employers.  Since that time, he has only completed a phone screening with a 
single employer.  Many of the students at Midlands University have received call-backs and 
others have gone on their first and second interviews with prospective employers.  After 
investigation, Treyvon discovers that many of the employers that have responded to several of 
his peers‟ employment inquires are the same employers to whom he also sent resumes.  He is 
perplexed by the lack of interest that employers are showing his resume, which implicitly 
showcases the practical experiences that he has acquired.  Since Treyvon regularly converses 
with many of his peers who have received call-backs, he personally knows that they do not have 
qualifications that are superior to his.  These turn of events has Treyvon wondering, “Is there 
something about me that is impeding my employment prospects? Could it be because I am a 
product of the „ghetto?‟ Or is it simply because I am black?”  Unfortunately, for Treyvon, Title 
VII statutory framework currently used in determining whether discriminatory tactics are at use 
by employers will likely not provide any clarity as it pertains to his dilemma. 
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III.    TITLE VII STATUTORY FRAMEWORK 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers from: (1) not hiring or 
discharging individuals, or otherwise differentiating among individuals with respect to 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin; or (2) to categorize employees or applicants for employment in a manner 
which would hinder or tend to hinder them from job opportunities or otherwise adversely affect 
their status as employees, because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
11
  
During the time that Title VII was originally enacted, racial discrimination was open and 
categorical.
12
  Black people were frequently excluded from jobs or situated into positions with 
low pay and little prestige simply because of their race.
13
  This article reveals that race 
discrimination in employment is as vibrant today as it was in the mid 1900s.  Although, the 
Supreme Court has had several opportunities to address modern practices of discrimination in 
employment, it has repeatedly failed to do so.   
The EEOC is the government organization that has been charged with regulating charges 
of discrimination arising under Title VII.
14
  “Race remains the most frequently cited basis in 
discrimination charges, as it has since the Commission‟s inception.”
15
  The EEOC states that 
“[r]ace discrimination involves treating someone (an applicant or employee) unfavorably 
because he/she is of a certain race or because of personal characteristics associated with race 
                                                          
11
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2008). 
12
 Kimberly A. Yuracko, Trait Discrimination as Race Discrimination: An Argument About Assimilation, 74 GEO. 




 Occidental Life Ins. Co. of California v. E.E.O.C., 432 U.S. 355, 355 (1977) (the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Act of 1972 gives the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission authority to sue in federal courts when it finds 
reasonable cause to believe that there has been employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin). 
15
 Naomi C. Earp, Forty-Three and Counting: EEOC‟s Challenges and Successes and Emerging Trends in the 
Employment Arena, 25 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 133, 141 (2007). 
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(such as hair texture, skin color, or certain facial features).”
16
  This definition is defined quite 
loosely covering a broad range of attributes that are frequently associated with a person‟s race.
 17
  
Conversely, Title VII fails to explicitly define race in terms that can guide the Supreme Court in 
ruling on cases involving race discrimination.
18
  Courts have tended to use judicial definitions 
from Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection jurisprudence to supplement this void.
 19
  Take for 
instance, “the Supreme Court's suggest[ion] [in Fourteenth Amendment analysis] that one of the 
reasons that races and ethnic groups are offered antidiscrimination protection is because they 
possess visible, identifiable characteristics that function as irrational bases for stigma;” as a 
result, many courts that interpret Title VII have viewed it as intending to primarily address 
employment discrimination that is prompted by race/ethnicity-associated morphology.
20
 This 
results in a lack of precedent favorable for plaintiffs to use in establishing a prima facie claim of 
race discrimination under Title VII.   
Unfortunately, Title VII‟s disparate treatment and impact frameworks tend to support a 
claim that is more closely aligned with the Supreme Court‟s suggestion in Fourteenth 
Amendment analysis.  A close examination of the burdens which must be met within each 
framework demonstrates the barriers preventing recognition of discrimination which may be 
prompted by aspects that are not race/ethnicity-associated morphology. 
                                                          
16
 Angela P. Harris, From Color Line to Color Chart?: Racism and Colorism in the New Century, 10 BERKELEY J. 
AFR.-AM. L. & POL‟Y 52, 68 (2008). 
17
 See Onwuachi-Willig, supra  note 6, at 1313. 
18
 Camille Gear Rich, Performing Racial and Ethnic Identity: Discrimination by Proxy and the Future of Title VII, 




 Id.  
9 
 
a) Disparate Treatment 
In order for a plaintiff to prevail in a race discrimination in hiring case, he or she may use 
direct evidence tending to show discriminatory intent or apply the McDonnell-Douglas burden 
shifting standard to prove discrimination with indirect evidence.
21
  A plaintiff can establish this 
initial burden by showing (1) he or she is a part of a racial minority/protected class; (2) he or she 
submitted an application as a qualified candidate for the position at issue; (3) regardless of his or 
her qualifications, he or she was rejected; and (4) after his or her rejection, the position stayed 
open and applications were still sought from other individuals.
22
   
If a plaintiff can meet all three prongs, courts typically draw an inference of 
discrimination.
23
  The employer then has the burden of producing a legitimate non-
discriminatory reason for rejecting the applicant.
24
  A plaintiff then has the opportunity to prove 
that the reason given by the employer is not worthy of credence because the employer‟s decision 
was based on racial discrimination.
25
  Additionally, employers can employ a bona fide 
occupational defense (“BFOQ”) to substantiate its discriminatory actions towards applicants on 
the basis of religion, sex, or national origin.
26
  It has been argued that the BFOQ defense allows 
employers to justify discrimination against applicants or employees based on sex, religion, or 
national origin.
27
  To establish this defense an employer simply has to demonstrate that an 
applicant‟s religion, sex or national origin would significantly impede his/her performance of a 
                                                          
21
 Id. at 1290-91. 
22
 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 
23
 Onwuachi-Willig, supra  note 6, at 1291. 
24
 McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802.  
25
 Lacy, supra note 3, at 583.  
26
 Ritu Mahajan, The Naked Truth: Appearance Discrimination, Employment, And The Law, 14 ASIAN AM. L. J. 
165, 179 (2007).  
27
 Jordan D. Bello, Attractiveness as Hiring Criteria: Savvy Business Practice of Racial Discrimination?, 8 J. 





  The employer must prove that an applicant has to possess a protected 
characteristic needed to adequately perform the functions of the position, and hiring someone to 
the contrary would alter the nature of the business.
29
  Therefore, a plaintiff who cannot establish 
an employer‟s intentional discrimination may be more resourceful in determining whether he 
may prove a prima facie case under disparate impact analysis. 
b) Disparate Impact 
Courts use disparate impact analysis to examine employment practices that have an 
adverse impact on members of a protected group, although intent is not required.
30
  Disparate 
impact analysis requires a plaintiff to prove that an employer utilizes a specific employment 
practice that results in a disparate impact on a protected group.
31
   
Plaintiffs have encountered difficulty in establishing that a specific employment practice 
has a disparate impact on a certain group, because there are times when there are not many 
employees that are members of the relevant group, or those who do qualify choose to conform to 
a particular employment practice.
32
  Because of the subjective nature of many employment 
decisions, employees typically have a difficult time demonstrating that a particular employment 
practice actually caused the disparate effect.
33
  In the seminal case that established disparate 
impact analysis, Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
34
 the Supreme Court held that if a plaintiff is able to 
                                                          
28
 Mahajan, supra  note 26, at 179. 
29
 Id. at 179-80. 
30






 Barbara J. Flagg, Fashioning a Title VII Remedy for Transparently White Subjective Decisionmaking, 104 YALE 
L. J. 2009, 2027 (1995). 
34
 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
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prove a prima facie case, the employer then must demonstrate that the particular employment 
practice is justifiable because it serves a business necessity and relates to job performance.
35
 
Disparate impact theory is not an adequate standard for claims based on discriminatory 
proxies because discrimination is usually not premised on an employer‟s subjective mandates, 
which could be job relatedness and/or business necessity.  Rather, discrimination results from the 
application of particular standards by employers.
36
  Historically, courts have been given wide 
discretion in evaluating whether a proffered business concern overshadows the adverse effects of 
policies based on discriminatory proxies.
37
  This prompts the question of whether race even 
matters when courts have the discretion to disregard the adverse effects of policies on racial 
groups that have been “pre-designated” protected status?  
IV.  WHAT IS RACE? DOES RACE MATTER? 
“Race may be America’s single most confounding problem, but the confounding 
problem of race is that few people seem to know what race is.”
38
 
a) Origins of Race 
Professor Cornel West once said, “[t]o engage in a serious discussion of race in America, 
we must begin not with the problems of black people but with the flaws of American society – 
                                                          
35
 Id. at 431. 
36
 Mahajan,  supra  note 26, at 180. 
37
 Flagg, supra note 33, at 2021-22 (The nature of the proffered business concern burden is ambiguous.  In Griggs, 
the Court stated that an employer simply needs to demonstrate that an employment practice has “a demonstrable 
relationship to successful performance of the jobs for which it is used.” Such an unclear formulation does not firmly 
establish the kinds of purposes that suffice as a business necessity justification, the form of evidence needed to show 
a relationship between the purpose and the employment practice,  the necessary force of that connection, along with 
the significance of the employer‟s stated purpose, and relationship between business necessity and job relatedness. 
These issues have not been clarified by the Supreme Court.  Unfortunately, “[i]n the 1991 Civil Rights Act, 
Congress relied on [Supreme Court decisions that were rendered prior to Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 
U.S. 642 (1989)] to define the concepts of „consistent with business necessity‟ and „job-related‟ and thus preserved 
the ambiguity inherent in those opinions”).  
38
 Ian. F. Lopez, The Societal Construction of Race: Some observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 
HARV. C.R.-CL. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1994).  
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flaws rooted in historic inequalities and longstanding cultural stereotypes.”
39
  America has an 
extensive history of distinguishing among persons based on race.
40
  An individual‟s racial 
identity has long been important in determining personal status and legal rights.
41
  Professor Paul 
Finkelman recently stated that, “[t]he word „race‟ defies precise definition in American Law.  No 
physical attribute or collection of physical attributes adequately defines „race.‟”
42
  However, the 
concept of race is at the pinnacle of contemporary discussions involving employment, healthcare, 
politics, and practically every aspect of what shapes our society today.  Courts and legislatures 
have long struggled to define the line between “black” and “white” primarily to “separate the 
privileged from those with limited or no privileges.”
43
  
Virginia was the first state in the union to attempt to provide a statutory definition of 
race.
44
  However, the 1662 statute was only designed to determine the legal position of children 
that belonged to Negro women but were fathered by Englishmen.
45
  The language of the 1662 
statute declared that the status of a child would be determined by the status of the mother.
46
  
Subsequently, Virginia and Arkansas created statutes that looked to physical appearance in 
defining Negros as possessing “a visible and distinct admixture of African blood.”
47
 
                                                          
39
 CORNEL WEST, RACE MATTERS  3 (Beacons Press 2001) (1993). 
40
 Luther Wright, Jr., Who‟s Black, Who‟s White, and Who Cares: Reconceptualizing the United States Definition of 
Race and Racial Classifications, 48 VAND. L. REV. 513, 517 (1995). 
41










 Id. at 523 (this was a departure from the English rule that determined a child‟s status from the paternal line). 
47
 Id. at 523-24 (other states that decided to define race adopted one-fourth, one-sixteenth, and one-thirty-second 
rules which determined that individuals who possessed these fractional quantities of black ancestry were legally 
black. By 1910, the majority of states applied the “one-drop rule”, which determined that anyone with a drop of 
African or black blood was legally black). 
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Consequently, these laws spurred litigation in which courts had to begin dealing with 
questions of racial definition.
48
  An example of the inability of the courts to precisely define race 
is evident in Hudgins v. Wright,
49
 wherein two judges disagreed as to the evidentiary importance 
of physical appearance in determining whether the plaintiff was Black or Native American.
50
  It 
was stated by Judge Tucker that “even if one‟s color is in doubt because of „racial‟ mingling, „a 
flat nose and wooly [sic] hair,‟ which disappear „the last of all,‟ can serve as reliable indicators 
of an individual‟s status as „African.‟”
51
  Judge Roane disagreed that such a determination could 
always be made from only inspection of certain characteristics.
52
   
Even in today‟s society, race has not yet been defined substantively.
53
  Society‟s inability 
to define race is one of the most compelling issues in this nation.
54
  There are currently federal 
statutes created to combat racial discrimination in areas of employment, voting, housing, 
enforcement of contracts, and education.
55
  Numerous other policies and vital activities in the 
United States are attached to race.
56
  “Yet amid all of the evidence that racial classification is of 
great significance in American Society, the law has provided no consistent definition of race and 
no logical way to distinguish members of different races from one another.”
57
 Therefore, race 
matters conceivably now more than ever. 
                                                          
48
Hoffman, supra  note 41, at 1130. 
49
 11 Va. (1 Hen.) 134, 143 (1806) (the plaintiff was granted freedom by persuading the court that she was Indian 
and not black.  She asserted that her mother, a slave, was Indian.  Her “red complexion” and “straight hair,” were 
evidence that she could not possibly be black). 
50














 Id. at 519. 
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b) Is Race Biological? OR Is Race a Societal Creature? 
Courts confronted with Title VII issues have historically defined race as a biological 
concept, and discrimination as a response to certain biologically predetermined traits.
58
  Federal 
courts‟ understanding of the McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting framework and laws designed 
to address discrimination in the workplace have repeatedly been criticized by various scholars.
59
  
“Scholars have generally analyzed antidiscrimination law in employment as disregarding and 
failing to account for the social realities of racism.”
60
  For example, Romona L. Paetzold and 
Rafael Gely have argued that Title VII, as interpreted, does not offer a framework capable of 
dealing with the issues that nontraditional employees face within the internal labor market.
61
   
Professors Devon Carbado and Mitu Gulati have studied the ways in which 
antidiscrimination law does not account for the way in which racial and gender stereotyping 
disadvantage racial minorities.
62
  Their research has discovered that this failure of 
antidiscrimination does not recognize “that race is not purely a physical concept,
63
 but also a 
societal construct.”
64
  Consequently, employees who file race discrimination claims are 
adversely affected.
65
     
                                                          
58
 Rich, supra note 18, at 1134. 
59
 Onwuachi-Willig, supra  note 6, at 1292. 
60
 Id. at 1293. 
61
 Romona L. Paetzold, Through The Looking Glass: Can Title VII Help Women and Minorities Shatter The Glass 
Ceiling?, 31 HOUS. L. REV. 1517, 1520 (1995). 
62
 Devon W. Carbado, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259, 1279-1308 (2000) (providing details of how 
women and people of color tend to change their identities to combat discrimination and use of stereotypes within the 
work environment). 
63
 Onwuachi-Willig, supra  note 6, at 1292 (classification based on persons with certain skin color or other physical 
features that symbolizes membership in a particular racial group). 
64





In Perkins v. Lake County Dept. of Utilities,
66
 an employer who was accused of racial 
discrimination under Title VII, challenged whether the plaintiff was Native American.
67
   The 
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio was confronted with the issue of the extent 
to which provable genetic/hereditary classification controls on the proposition of membership in 
a protected class within the meaning of Title VII.
68
  Once the Court analyzed the historical 
problem associated with defining race, it determined that an employer‟s “reasonable belief” that 
a person is a member of a particular protected class governed the issue in the case.
69
  Lake 
County Dept. of Utilities hired an expert to trace the plaintiff‟s ancestry, which led to the 
conclusion that the plaintiff was less than one-sixteenth Native American.
70
  In spite of this 
evidence, “the [C]ourt held that the plaintiff‟s appearance, self-identification, and the employer‟s 
initial belief and concession that the plaintiff had some Native American ancestry was enough to 
prove membership within a protected class under Title VII.”
71
   
The Court believed that it was consistent with the intent of Title VII to hold that 
appearance and perception are paramount when racial discrimination is involved.
72
  It was 
determined by the court that although the biological question of race is relevant, it is not 
conclusive, and therefore it would consider both biological and societal factors in determining 
racial classifications.
73
  The court‟s rationale underlying its decision is mostly inconsistent with 
the holdings of many courts, which state that an employer will only be liable under Title VII if 
an employee is sanctioned for displaying involuntary biological, visible, or blatant 
                                                          
66
 Perkins v. Lake County Dept. of Utilities, 860 F. Supp. 1262 (N.D. Ohio 1994). 
67




 Wright, Jr., supra  note 40, at 553-54. 
70
 Perkins, 860 F. Supp. at 1266-70. 
71
 Wright, Jr., supra note 40, at 554. 
72
 Perkins, 860 F. Supp. at 1277. 
73
 Wright, Jr., supra note 40, at 554. 
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distinctiveness associated with a disfavored racial group.
74
  Therefore, the question of whether 
race should be regarded as biological or socially constructed is likely to remain an issue for 
courts analyzing future racial discrimination claims brought under Title VII.  More importantly, 
this issue is likely to allow discrimination in the workplace to evolve and transform into 
stereotypical practices in which Title VII will not provide a remedy. 
V. NOW THAT TREYVON HAS SUBMITTED HIS RESUME 
a) There is More to Treyvon Than Just His Name  
Several years after the Civil Rights Era, although employers are conscious that outward 
racial prejudices are not a legally adequate basis for rendering employment decisions, employers 
can and do use proxies
75
 for race, both consciously and unconsciously, in excluding certain 
people from employment.
76
  This form of trait discrimination has increasingly become the focus 
of Title VII litigation today.
77
   
 Three months have now passed and Treyvon is still awaiting responses from employers.  
Although he has not yet received any in-person interviews, he has completed four phone-
interviews.  He believes that the phone-interviews went extremely well; nevertheless none have 
resulted in an in-person interview.  As Treyvon ponders on possible factors that could be 
adversely affecting his employment search, he hesitantly dismisses the idea that his race could be 
an issue since he did not indicate it on his applications.  However, how correct is Treyvon in 
making this assumption?                            
                                                          
74
 See Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc. 527 F. Supp. 299, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
75
 Discrimination based on traits associated with a particular group.  
76
 Onwuachi-Willig, supra  note 6, at 1297-98. 
77
 Yuracko, supra note 12, at 366. 
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Studies have increasingly demonstrated that characteristics associated with race have 
“gain[ed] meaning as a defining feature of a racial group and, as a result, have created a basis on 
which employers and others may discriminate against an individual due to race-based 
[stereotypes] or prejudices toward such characteristics.”
78
  Historically there have been several 
stereotypes associated with “whiteness” and “blackness.”
79
  Adjectives such as “innocence, 
worthiness, competence, collegial, articulate, intelligent, and non-threatening have all been 
associated with „whiteness.‟”
80
  Alternatively, stereotypes such as “athletic, incompetent, guilty, 
unworthy, occupational instability, primitive morality, threatening, and dangerous,” have 
traditionally been associated with “blackness.”
81
  Just as society “often link[s] color with 
undesirable personal qualities . . .,” it frequently also links a person‟s voice or name with color 
and race, and various other negative stereotypes.
82
  These characteristics at many times “carry 
enough ethnic meaning to . . . burden [a person‟s] daily existence with stereotypes imposed by 
others.”
83
   
Scholars Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan conducted a study entitled, Are 
Emily and Greg More Employable Than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor 
Market Discrimination.
84
  This study exposed employment practices used by various employers 
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Bertrand and Mullainathan‟s field experiment consisted of answering help-wanted 
advertisements in The Boston Globe and The Chicago Tribune by sending resumes.
87
  Since 
resumes rarely state race, they randomly assigned African American sounding names to some 
resumes and white sounding names to others.
88
  The employers were left with no other means to 
determine the race of a particular applicant but by name.
89
  The results of the experiment 
demonstrated that white sounding names received fifty percent (50%) more callbacks for 
interviews than African American sounding names.
90
  Further, the study demonstrated that 
federal contractors and employers who assert “Equal Opportunity Employer” status in their 
advertisements also discriminate to the degree that other employers do.
91
 
The results of Bertrand and Mullainathan‟s study reveals that Title VII has not been 
successful in combating current practices of discrimination.  This is mostly contributed to the 
failure of the judiciary to acknowledge the shift away from facial acts of discrimination to acts 
that are generally more subtle.
92
  Treyvon is a primary example of someone who could probably 
benefit from a change of perspective by the judiciary in regards to discriminatory stereotypes and 
proxies for race.  It is likely that Treyvon may be victim of racial discriminatory employment 
tactics similar to those used by employers in Bertrand and Mullainathan‟s study.  Many would 
agree that the name “Treyvon” is prone to be viewed as a “black name” within today‟s society, 
and absent any other disqualifying factors, may just what is hindering Treyvon‟s job search.  
                                                          
87
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b) Treyvon‟s Qualifications or The Perceived Meaning of His Appearance? 
“Even if one does not accept today that a black candidate with the same credentials 
as a white candidate should be given a preference because of race, fair minds must 




Does improving credentials of black applicants positively affect discrimination in 
employment?  Although it would appear that improved credentials would make black applicants 
more marketable within the labor market, several studies have demonstrated otherwise.  
Particularly, Urban Institute‟s 1990 employment discrimination study, Opportunities Denied, 
Opportunities Diminished; Racial Discrimination in Hiring,
94
 and Jomills H. Braddock II and 
James M. McPartland‟s, How Minorities Continue to be Excluded from Equal Employment 
Opportunities: Research on Labor Market and Institutional Barriers,
95
 both reveal that race in 
many instances outweighs credentials that are held by black applicants.  Additionally, this 
phenomenon is evident from Treyvon‟s plight as a well-qualified black man seemingly unable to 
compete in the labor market among similarly qualified non-black job seekers. 
Turner‟s study assembled 10 pairs of young black and white men in the Washington D.C. 
and Chicago metropolitan areas, and matched them on all aspects that could impact hiring 
decisions.
96
  The hiring audit demonstrated that black job seekers were met with widespread acts 
of discrimination throughout the hiring process.
97
  In fifteen percent (15%) of the audits, the 
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 Braddock‟s study found that, 
for lower-level jobs, white workers were disproportionately represented in 
jobs stressing the following characteristics: (1) skills: advanced reading, 
basic or advanced arithmetic; (2) intellectual traits: quick learner, good 
judgment; and (3) attitudinal traits: being a good team member, and fostering 
good client relations. With respect to these skills and intellectual traits, the 
authors determined that individual differences in educational attainment and 




This trend can be directly attributed to employer preference for white candidates rather than 
“equally qualified” black candidates.
100
   
It has also been suggested “that some white interviewers are predisposed to believing that 
[black applicants], no matter what their qualifications, [cannot] be as qualified as white 
candidates.”
101
  Similarly, Bertrand and Mullainathan found in their study that there was a small 
and statistically insignificant impact for black applicants to have higher quality resumes.
102
 “This 
lower reward for [black applicants] suggests that, [in the current state of the labor market], 
[black applicants] do not have strong individual incentives to build a stronger resume.”
103
  
This phenomenon unfortunately will impact Treyvon‟s search for employment.  Although 
he has worked extremely hard to ensure that he is as qualified as his peers, employers in today‟s 
market would likely give more consideration to Treyvon‟s appearance as a black person rather 
than his superior credentials.  So what must Treyvon do to convince employers that he is as 
qualified as white applicants vying for similar positions?  Regrettably, there is probably nothing 
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that he can do since skin color seems to be the most valued credential in today‟s labor market.  
Perhaps, yet more alarming, is the fact that even once Treyvon manages to land a job, he is likely 
to be confronted with discriminatory policies which will seek to compel him to conceal his 
identity as a black man.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
VI. WHEW!  NOW THAT TREYVON HAS THE JOB: TITLE VII CASES 
a)  “Facially Neutral” Grooming Policies and Trait/Proxy Discrimination 
 
Individuals convey their identities through social practices, including the decisions they 
make about dress and appearance practices.
104
  Treyvon has always expressed his pride for his 
identity through the wearing of his nicely-kept dreadlocks, and plans to continue this practice as 
he began working at the large accounting firm that recently extended to him an offer of 
employment.  It has widely been recognized that Title VII does not protect 
individuals/employees who have been discriminated against based on “voluntary” or 
“performed” features of racial or ethnic identity.
105
  This form of discrimination is frequently 
referred to as “discrimination by proxy.”
106
  Title VII‟s legislative history demonstrates that 
Congress “has never indicated that race or national origin should be defined under the statute in a 
manner that categorically bars all claims concerning voluntary aspects of racial or ethnic 
identity.”
107
  These voluntary or performed features include “any behavior or voluntary displayed 
attribute which, by accident or design, communicates racial or ethnic identity or status.”
108
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Employers today often control the appearance of their employees by implementing 
grooming and dressing policies.
109
  Some suggest that employers use these policies as tools to 
appeal to customers, and to maintain societal norms and cultural conformity of the company.
110
  
Employers also frequently use grooming and dressing policies “to build on commonly learned 
associations” that signify certain characteristics that a company may seek to use in order to align 
itself with specific values.
111
  It is further suggested that dressing and grooming policies facilitate 
essential business related functions such as public image of the company, safety, increased 
productivity, and increased employee morale.
112
 
While employing dressing and grooming policies to ensure certain essential business 
related functions may sometimes be necessary, there are many problems associated with these 
policies.  Grooming and dressing policies are important since they encompass an employer‟s 
intentional or unintentional discrimination.
113
  These policies are problematic because they 
require “the judging of employees based on qualities unrelated to job performance” and further 
“reflect[s] certain prejudices [by] adversely affect[ing] the individuals against whom they are 
enforced.”
114
  “Such policies are „arbitrary, irrational, and unfair,‟ as they harm society by 
affirming certain appearance-related stereotypes and biases.”
115
  Even more troubling is the fact 
that it is not illegal for employers to use this type of criteria.
116
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 Michelle L. Turner, The Braided Uproar: A Defense of my Sister‟s Hair and a Contemporary Indictment of 
Rogers v. American Airlines, 7 CARDOZO WOMEN‟S L.J. 115, 119 (2001). 
114







In her article, Work Culture and Discrimination, Professor Tristin Green, discusses the 
tendency for grooming and dressing policies to favor dominant group standards.
117
  As white 
males are prone to be the dominant group to be in charge of implementing and enforcing these 
policies, it is likely that the work culture created will disadvantage people of color.
118
  “Nor 
would it be surprising that employer appearance standards generally devalue racial, cultural, and 
religious diversity, often requiring conformity to white, heterosexual notions of beauty and 
appearance.”
119
  Examples of the effects that these policies have on individuals are evident in 
cases such as Rogers v. American Airlines, Inc.,
120
 Carswell v. Peachford Hospital,
121
 and Smith 
v. Delta Airlines, Inc.
122
 
Renee Rogers, a black female employed by American Airlines, sued the airline for 
unlawful discrimination under Title VII based on the company‟s grooming policy.
123
  She sought 
$10,000.00 in damages, as well as injunctive and declaratory relief against enforcement of the 
grooming policy.
124
  The policy prohibited women from wearing all-braided hairstyles.
125
  
Rogers was terminated for wearing a braided “corn-row” hairstyle.
126
  She argued that the 
braided hairstyle carried significance to black women who expressed their cultural and historical 
essence through wearing it.
127
   
The District Court rejected Roger‟s claim for the following reasons: “(1) the grooming 
policy equally applied to all genders and races, (2) the policy only regulated something that 
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could easily be changed, namely Rogers‟ hair and[,] (3) that the wearing of the hairstyle did not 
concern a matter of high importance with respect to constitutional issues.”
128
  The District Court 
reasoned that Rogers‟ braided hairstyle was not protected under Title VII because it was not an 
immutable characteristic,
129
 and further implied that Rogers‟ braided hairstyle was not really 
associated with African American culture.
130
 
 A similar grooming policy was challenged by Emma Carswell when she was terminated 
for refusing to abide by the policy.
131
  She brought an unlawful racial discrimination claim 
against her employer, Peachford Hospital.
132
  This unwritten policy required employees working 
in the detoxification unit to dress conservatively.
133
  There were no complaints about Carswell‟s 
job performance, and the only issues that the hospital had were pertaining to her chosen 
hairstyle.
134
  Carswell wore her hair in corn-rows with two or more colored beads on the ends.
135
  
She was asked to remove the beads from her hair or wear some type of head cover, but refused 
and was subsequently put on suspension.
136
  Carswell was later terminated.
137
   
 Carswell argued that the grooming policy caused a disproportionate impact on black 
people who frequently wore this hairstyle.
138
  The United States District Court held that Carswell 
was fired solely because of her failure to abide by her employer‟s grooming policy.
139
  Further, 
the court held that Carswell‟s wearing of beads was not an immutable characteristic such as race 
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 Another grooming policy, yet different, was challenged by Leon Smith who had worked 
as an agent to Delta Airlines for nine months.
142
  He was terminated for failing to follow a 
company grooming policy pertaining to facial hair.
143
  Leon brought a Title VII action alleging 
racial discrimination.
144
  Delta‟s grooming policy stated that,  
[s]ideburns shall be no longer than even with the lower portion of the soft 
lobe of the ear, and shall be light to moderate in thickness, such that there is 
no appreciable change in facial outline therefrom. No „porkchops' will be 
allowed.” “Mustaches” Mustaches are acceptable if kept short and neatly 




Leon argued that black men had more difficulty complying with the grooming policy due to the 
nature of hair growth.
146
  The trial court held that the grooming policy was not invalid and thus 
not racially motivated.
147
  The court reasoned that the rule applied evenly to men of all races and 
should not be struck down as a result.
148
  In this instance, “the [c]ourt [believed] that a black 
person c[ould] have a closely trimmed sideburn, or if the company requires it, c[ould] have 
closely trimmed hair.  It may require more trimming more often to do that[, but the court did] not 
see then that the rule itself [was] being discriminatory.”
149
  The United States Court of Appeals 
also held that the grooming policy was not discriminatory.
150
  This trend tending to demonstrate 
the reluctance of courts in recognizing the impact of grooming policies on black employees may 
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likely become an issue for Treyvon at his new job or at some time throughout his professional 
career. 
b) The Courts Just Don‟t Get It!  
Rogers, Carswell, and Smith are all primary examples of the unwillingness of courts to 
protect individuals who have fallen victim to racial discrimination based on grooming policies 
and various proxies for race.  In each instance, the employer instituted a grooming policy which 
disproportionately affected a black employee.  Each court held that there was no discrimination 
present because the grooming policies were applied equally and did not affect an immutable 
characteristic held by the black employee.  “In essence courts treat being a member of a 
protected group differently from behavior associated with that group and are less likely to protect 
individuals from discrimination based on mutable appearance choices because individuals are 
capable of avoiding discrimination by changing those traits.”
151
  Courts will only prohibit 
employers from imposing trait requirements that are not relevant to the job when immutability 
and a disparate impact occur simultaneously.
152
   
 In the Title VII context, the immutability construct operates in a way that limits claims 
within protected classes by essentially separating specific parts of protected class identity from 
statutory protection.
153
  An example of this proposition is evident from the Rogers Court noting 
that Renee Rogers‟ braids had to be set apart from a form of involuntary and immutable race-
associated trait, like the Afro.
154
  Courts have failed to realize that the most devastating effect of 
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this immutability requirement is the unclear distinction between mutability/immutability and the 
need for black individuals to assimilate. 
 Courts tend to give the mutability/immutability distinction much more deference than it 
deserves.
155
  Professor Kimberly A. Yuracko carefully notes that not many traits, including skin 
color and sex are actually immutable.
156
  She further states that “[t]rait mutability/immutability 
seems most often to be a matter of degree of difficulty rather than of absolute possibility.
157
  It 
may be more difficult for a man with [pseudofolliculitis barbae]
158
 to shave than it is for a 
woman with cornrows to adopt a different hairstyle, but neither is impossible.”
159
  Therefore, this 
distinction makes it quite clear that the courts are providing an injustice rather than justice to 
those individuals who have raised racial discrimination claims resulting from grooming policies 
and other proxies for race. 
 Lastly, courts frequently fail to protect individuals from demands to assimilate to societal 
norms if those demands pertain to mutable characteristics.
160
  Further, many courts fail to require 
employers to justify legally valid reasons for requiring assimilation within the workplace.
161
 
Growing scholarly debate has suggested that laws prohibiting discrimination should protect 
individuals from being required as an employment condition, to relinquish essential traits and 
attributes of their protected group.
162
  For example, Devon Carbado and Mitu Gulati argue that 
requiring black but not white people to do identity work to fit in at their place of employment is 
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discriminatory and violates Title VII.
163
  This form of decision-making by white employers is 
burdensome because it makes black employees abandon essential facets of their “blackness” or 
group identity in order to prosper in their employment.
164
  Nevertheless, courts continue to 
overlook the fact that assimilation allows workplace inequities to thrive.      
VII. RECOMMENDATION 
Recognizing that the courts have continually allowed employers to discriminate against 
applicants and employees through the use of proxies for race and grooming/appearance policies, 
now is the time for reform that will compel the judicial system to change its current view of 
modern discrimination claims.  Scholars have long grappled with many ideas pertaining to the 
way in which current anti-discrimination statutes can be revisited in attempt to eradicate 
employer use of racial proxies in hiring and grooming/appearance policies, along with the need 
for black individuals to lose their sense of “blackness” in order to remain competitive within 
today‟s workforce. 
Attorneys Rosalio Castro and Lucia Corral have argued that Title VII interpretation must 
be expanded to better achieve its intended purpose.
165
  They have suggested that Congress 
modify the language of Title VII by “includ[ing] the phrase „or any combination thereof‟ to the 
text of the statute to make the law inclusive.”
166
  Other scholars have advocated for creating a 
new legal right under current disparate treatment and impact theories that would essentially 
create an avenue that would allow individuals to preserve their cultural identities within the 
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  A disparate treatment approach such as this would permit a black man, such as 
Treyvon, or black woman with dreadlocks to file a claim of discrimination for being subjected to 
adverse treatment related to stereotypes and grooming policies triggered by race.
168
  
Additionally, Barbara Flagg has introduced two highly examined frameworks from which she 
believes would address workplace discrimination based on what she considers “white subjective 
decision-making.”
169
  She argues that the Foreseeable Impact and Alternatives Model would 
effectively reach the objective of Title VII.
170
   
The Foreseeable Impact Model is similar to current disparate impact analysis, but it 
modifies certain aspects of the analytical framework.
171
  This approach would avoid present 
disparate impact issues related to proving actual disparate effects because “foreseeable” disparate 
effects would be emphasized.
172
  To demonstrate a foreseeable disparate effect, one only needs to 
show the criterion used by an employer is associated more frequently among whites instead of 
other racial groups.
173
  There also would need to be a showing that whites view the criterion 
positively.
174
  Flagg argues that this approach focuses closely on the characteristics that are being 
dispersed unevenly rather than on a particular individual.
175
   
 The Alternatives Model focuses directly to “capture the structural nature of 
discrimination” by departing from existing disparate impact analysis.
176
  When analyzing a 
                                                          
167
 Tristin K. Green, Work Culture and Discrimination, 93 CAL. L. REV. 623, 664-66 (2005).  See e.g., Devon W. 
Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law and Economics of Critical Race Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1757 (2003) (disparate 
treatment); Robert J. Gonzalez, Note, Cultural Rights and the Immutability Requirement in Disparate Impact 
Doctrine, 55 STAN L. REV. 2195 (2003) (disparate impact). 
168
 Id.  
169




 Flagg, supra note 33, at 2039. 
172
 Id. at 2041. 
173




 Id. at 198. 
176
 Flagg, supra note 33, at 2044. 
30 
 
nonwhite individual‟s claim, racial workplace structure would be examined first.
177
  If the place 
of employment is found to be structured with whites occupying the majority of authoritative 
positions, a presumption is raised that white-specific criteria was the determining factor in a 
specific employment decision.
178
  The employer would then be charged with demonstrating the 
specific criterion that was used when making the employment decision, along with its 
objectives.
179
  The plaintiff would then be charged with showing that there is an alternative 




Although the Foreseeable Impact and Alternatives Model seem to have many positive 
aspects, I am not an avid proponent of either approach.  There are several flaws within the two 
frameworks which will likely render the frameworks unworkable.  While Foreseeable Impact 
seeks to create a balance between regulation and employer autonomy, it unfairly “posits 
differences between whites as a group and nonwhites as a group.”
181
  The Alternatives Model 
addresses direct structural problems by providing a response, but nevertheless totally fails to 
preserve a level of autonomy for private employers.
182
  Therefore, these flaws make both 
approaches fall outside of the original intent of Title VII when enacted. 
The approach that I support is a cross between Professor Maurice E. R. Munroe‟s 
proposal for EEOC reform
183
 and Professor Kristin K. Green‟s administrative alternative.
184
   
Munroe‟s approach would call for Congress to create a new framework from which unlawful 
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discriminatory practices can be effectively addressed.
185
  The EEOC‟s principal objective would 
be to eliminate discrimination, but no longer with a focus on individual charges.
186
  The focus of 
investigations would be to determine whether employers are utilizing discriminatory 
employment practices.
187
  The EEOC would use current statistical information that it already 
receives from employers through statutorily required reports to focus on employers who have an 
inexplicably low number of black individuals employed and/or in management positions.
188
 
Green‟s administrative alternative requires employers to file an annual report with the 
EEOC detailing all structural efforts taken to ensure that discriminatory employment practices 
are not being used by employers.
189
  The failure of an employer to take measures to rid 
discrimination in the workplace may be equated with “intent to discriminate in a systematic 
disparate treatment case.”
190
  Once employers demonstrate through the reporting requirement 
that they have introduced context-specific anti-discrimination measures, the EEOC may then 
compile the information to use in highlighting best practices to other employers who could use 
them as models when designing their own plans.
191
 
A combination of Munroe‟s and Green‟s recommendations as mentioned above would 
essentially create an approach which would force employers to ensure that they are 
implementing and utilizing hiring and workplace policies that are not discriminatory among 
black individuals.  Along with this combined approach, I would also suggest that the annual 
report from employers demonstrate that they are not solely utilizing subjective criterion when 
making hiring decisions.  Holistically, this approach would not only protect black employees 
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from being compelled to assimilate, but also prevent applicants such as Treyvon, from being 
denied employment opportunities equal to that of their white counterparts through employer 
support of diversity initiatives.    
Furthermore, the EEOC would still be required to provide employers with notice prior to 
commencement of an investigation.
192
  The most important aspect of this approach to taxpayers 
would likely pertain to the amount of funds that will be saved as a result of the EEOC 
abandoning the current requirement of handling all individual complaints.
193
 Additionally, 
individuals will still have the right to hire their own attorneys to privately sue employers for 
discrimination under Title VII.
194
  Rather than revisiting Title VII as suggested by other scholars, 
application of this administrative-based approach would likely prove to be more efficient and 
effective than the current controversial processes available to combat employment 
discrimination. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
 Society cannot afford to continue to disregard the harmful effects that stereotypes and 
proxies for race have on black applicants and employees in today‟s labor market.  It is time for 
effective and efficient reform that will address the illegal behavior that is increasingly being 
utilized by employers as a basis for employment decisions.  Well qualified black individuals 
such as Treyvon will suffer profusely if action is not immediately taken.  The EEOC has stood at 
the forefront of combating discriminatory work practices, and should continue its efforts, yet in a 
more proficient manner.  By developing a comprehensive plan such as the combined approach 
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that I suggested above, we will be taking the first step towards acknowledging the employment 
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